

Reviews of Cook Islands and Tuvalu are not included in this issue.

#### AMERICAN SAMOA

Elections, continuing financial crises, department director rejections and resignations, and investigations of white collar crime were some of the high-lights in the territory in 1992-93.

In the November 1992 elections for governor, the two dominant figures in American Samoan politics for the past fifteen years, Peter Coleman and A. P. Lutali, once again faced off in what proved to be a clear victory for Lutali. He and his lieutenant governor, Tauese Sunia, garnered 53.2 percent of the vote compared to 36.5 percent for Coleman and his running mate, Senator Letuli Toloa. This represented a substantial voter switch from the 1988 election. Candidates Pili and Pritchard placed third and last, respectively. Their slightly more than 10 percent of the vote was disappointing, given their new economic ideas and calls for restoration of morality and personal responsibility in government. In the congressional ballot, incumbent Faleomavaega Eni Hunkin overwhelmed the opposition with 64.4 percent of the vote compared to 18.3 percent for second place finisher Tautai Aviata Fa'alevao.

Though assurances were given of a smooth transition, the governor-elect and his transition team faced some questionable tactics on the part of the outgoing Coleman administration. Several of these were publicly perceived

as deliberate attempts to make matters as difficult as possible for the new administration. An advance payment of US\$44,000 was made to the Washington office run by Coleman's son-in-law a few weeks after the election, while numerous violations of the 1989 executive order freezing new hiring, salary increases, and increments were reported. Governor-elect Lutali expressed little surprise at the actions of his opponents, and declared his intention of closing the Washington office because it was "a waste of tax-payer's money" (*Samoa News*, 23 Nov 1992). In the past, the Coleman administration had contended that the consulting services Lutali relied on in Washington, DC were more costly and less effective than those provided by Coleman's son-in-law.

When Lutali served in the senate, he was accused of political obstruction by the administration. He now has to cope with the same potential problem. As anticipated, the new administration encountered stern opposition from some quarters of the *fono*, particularly the senate. Lutali lost two battles over his nominations of department directors. Salu Hunkin, younger sister of Congressman Hunkin and nominee for director of education, was twice rejected by the senate, with former house speaker Tuana'itau Tuia leading the opposition. Hunkin's selection, and subsequent rejection by the senate, generated a spate of letters in the local press, both in her support and oppos-

ing her. Congressman Hunkin accused the former speaker of sabotaging the nomination as a personal vendetta against himself. The two politicians have had several publicized disputes during the past few years, and although Tuia denies any personal reasons for his no vote, many public supporters of Salu Hunkin feel that her qualifications for the directorship far outweigh the contentions of her opponents. She has recently been appointed deputy director of education. The other twice-rejected nominee was acting hospital director, Tagoa'i Matt Tunoa.

Two embarrassing mishaps concerning directors tainted the Lutali administration in 1993. In early May, commissioner of public safety Victor Liu, who had been approved by the *fono*, was indicted for the alleged embezzlement of US\$22,000 from the Los Angeles police department from which he had recently retired. Governor Lutali was compelled to request his resignation, although Liu claimed innocence. The governor's own son, Julius Lutali, was named as acting commissioner. A second director, also confirmed by the *fono*, American Samoa Development Bank President Fanuaea Gurr, was fired by the governor on 16 June. Her removal followed the recommendation of the development bank board, which uncovered discrepancies and mismanagement activities involving the president and two other employees.

In line with his campaign pledge to combat corruption, waste, and abuse in government, the governor initiated a course of action that included establishment of a white collar crime task

force and federal audits of government operations. Task force investigations of the Territorial Administration on Aging led to an arrest warrant being issued for the former director and his secretary. Fourteen criminal charges have been filed against the two suspects, including the "forging and cashing of senior citizens' food vouchers worth thousands of dollars" (*Samoa News*, 2 July 93). Although investigations of alleged criminal activity at the Territorial Administration on Aging were initiated by the Department of Public Safety in 1992, pressure from former governor Coleman's office curtailed their continuation. Other government departments under task force scrutiny at the end of the review period included Public Works, Parks and Recreation, and the Office of Motor Vehicles.

American Samoa's financial woes continued with no end in sight. The new administration took over a treasury emptied of reserves, and the repercussions were felt throughout the community. In the second week of January, Lutali's revenue task force recommended the layoff of over four hundred unbudgeted employees as a first step in addressing the deficit. This prompted an immediate public backlash from affected families and opponents in the *fono*. The first phase of Operation Reduction in Force will save an estimated US\$3 million annually, or 3 percent of the government's US\$100 million annual personnel expenditures. Phase two of the operation began in March with the reversal of all salary increases, promotions and new hires made after 1990, when the Coleman "freeze" was to have become effective.

In addition, a 35-hour work week went into effect for all government employees of the executive division, except teachers and hospital employees. The initiative was discussed heatedly in the senate, with claims that the *fono* was ignored and denied opportunity to consult with administration officials about possible alternatives.

Auditors of the Inspector General's Office reported the government deficit to be US\$60 million, which meant local vendors were unable to collect on the reported US\$8 million owed them by the government. The Health Department owed more than US\$500,000 to off-island medical suppliers, resulting in frequent critical shortages of basic hospital supplies and medicines. Many taxpayers awaited tax refunds, about half of which have not been returned as the government shuffles scarce revenues to meet payroll and other outstanding debts.

Governor Lutali called a twenty-day special session of the legislature in late May to promote swift action on his revenue proposals. The proposed excise tax bill is the centerpiece of the revenue package, which calls for increased taxes on gasoline, commercial imports, heavy machinery, vehicles, liquor, and soda. The administration projected that US\$10 million would be raised. However, the house passed its own version of an amended excise tax, while the senate continued to seek alternatives other than raising taxes. The special session concluded on 14 June with no final action taken.

The Lutali-Tauese administration assumed the reigns of government with the unenviable task of rectifying a decade's worth of freewheeling, unac-

countable government spending and mismanagement. If they succeed, even in part, in restoring financial stability and credibility in the way the government of American Samoa conducts its operations, it will be a significant accomplishment.

BILL LEGALLEY

### FRENCH POLYNESIA

French neocolonialism in the Pacific, and the nuclear testing program in particular, has been much criticized by neighboring governments, but has encountered minimal opposition in Tahiti. Decades of reliance on expenditures by the CEP (Centre d'Experimentation du Pacifique) have persuaded islanders and resident expatriates alike that the nuclear testing program is vital to Tahiti's economic survival. Not surprisingly, France's decision to suspend nuclear testing in April 1992 was received with concern in Tahiti. The political fallout was felt intensely by the recently elected government of Gaston Flosse, already struggling for survival amidst huge budget deficits, corruption scandals, and abysmally low public confidence.

President Flosse claimed that the immediate halt of CEP activities would be economically and socially "catastrophic." He warned of an impending layoff of 5200 employees; a loss of 5000 business and government jobs indirectly related to the CEP; a shortfall of US\$45 million in the territorial budget; and losses of US\$600 million in revenues for the local economy (an estimated 22 percent decline). The suspension of nuclear testing was welcomed,

however, by the increasingly popular Oscar Temaru, leader of the pro-independence and antinuclear Tavini Huiraatira Party. Temaru also called for complete independence from France, and staged a public demonstration in Pape'ete, supported by (strange bedfellows) Boris Léontieff and Emile Vernaudon.

Worried that the testing program was coming to an abrupt end, Flosse dispatched a government delegation to France, demanding a cancellation of territorial debts, financial compensation for projected losses of jobs and local revenues, infrastructure development, and assistance in attracting overseas economic investment. In Paris, the delegation was assured that the tests had only been temporarily suspended for the remainder of the year; they would tentatively resume some time in the following year. The delegation was also promised a small amount of financial assistance for 1992. In addition, an ambitious and far reaching "Pact of Progress" between France and Tahiti was proposed.

The proposed Pact of Progress was to ensure collaborative effort on a long-term plan to address the territory's economic problems. Generous financial support would be provided by France, providing that France and Tahiti could agree on a realistic plan to shape Tahiti's economic, social, and cultural development for the following decade. The Tahitian economy was to be restructured, enabling a drop in the dependence rate on French expenditures from 75 percent to 55 percent by the year 2003. The man designated to develop the territorial proposal was Christian Vernaudon, chief executive officer of Air Tahiti, the territory's

largest and most successful private business.

In January, a delegation was dispatched to Paris with a completed proposal. The necessary economic restructuring was to be accomplished through expenditure of us\$2.7 billion over the next ten years. Of this, us\$2 billion was to go for the construction of roads, ports, airports, environmental facilities, water treatment and distribution, fuel storage depots, urban and maritime transportation, telecommunications, schools, hospitals, clinics, and sports facilities. The remainder would go for employment, research, social welfare, public health, and culture. France would be asked to contribute about us\$1 billion annually between 1993 and 1997, and us\$800 million over the following five years. The rest of the financing was to be provided by the European Community and local territorial expenditures.

The delegation returned from France with a provisional agreement based on a us\$3.2 billion spending program between 1993 and 2003. The jointly negotiated plan focussed on fourteen sectors, including infrastructure, development of the urban center and outer islands, employment and job training, social security, public health, education, telecommunications, family planning, and justice. An important political aspect of the pact was (for the first time) an explicit admission by France of its responsibility for the economic, social, and cultural upheavals resulting from the CEP. However, while a small amount of funding was underwritten by France for 1992, no agreement was reached on the long-term financing of the pact.

The sticky point was that France



was unwilling to provide financial support of the pact without real evidence that the territory itself was willing to assume some degree of fiscal responsibility. The Pape'ete government, struggling with a heavily dependent economy and mounting budget deficits, seemed unlikely to be able to make the necessary contribution and the negotiations appeared doomed to failure. A breakthrough came in June 1993 when, for the first time in Tahiti's history, an income tax was instituted, called the Contribution for Social Solidarity. The tax was relatively modest and would be graduated by income. Those earning US\$1,500 per month would pay 0.5 percent; those earning the highest monthly salaries (US\$15,000 or more) would pay 3.9 percent.

The pressure to institute the income tax came from France, which considered it an essential condition for Tahiti's contribution to the Pact of Progress. During previous election campaigns, Flosse had repeatedly gone on record as being absolutely opposed to an income tax. How then to proceed without losing face? Flosse's solution was regarded as a strategic master stroke in Tahiti. He called for a marathon meeting with local labor unions. During the negotiations, he reminded labor leaders of the problems Tahiti was facing, and asked for suggestions. After a long silence, Hiro Tefaarere, head of A Tia i Mua, suggested an income tax, upon which Flosse replied, "D'accord!"

Local observers cautioned that the income tax in itself would not solve Tahiti's substantial economic problems. Even if the announced income tax rate was substantially increased, tourism was stagnating, the pearl

industry faced international competition, and the artificially high cost of government was not likely to be offset without politically dangerous reductions of government salaries. It was also unclear if employees of the French state government could be taxed locally. Unanswered questions notwithstanding, Michel Jau, the recently appointed French High Commissioner, was reported to be quite happy with the new developments and confident that the Pact of Progress would soon become a reality and a long term solution to Tahiti's problems.

MOSHE RAPAPORT

Sources consulted for this report include recent issues of *La D  peche de Tahiti*, *Tahiti Pacifique*, and *Tahiti Sun Press*.

## HAWAIIAN ISSUES

In 1993, the centenary of the overthrow of the Hawaiian government by a gang of haole (white) businessmen and US marines, the biggest story was native sovereignty.

After more than twenty years of political organizing, native Hawaiian nationalists finally succeeded in forcing the issue of self-determination upon a resisting State of Hawai'i Democratic Party machine and an ignorant, often racist, public. The issues are simple: Hawaiians, who compose 20 percent of the resident population of the state, demand recognition as a native people with human rights claims to sovereignty, including self-government; they claim restitution from the US government for the taking of Hawaiian domain and dominion in 1893, and for their subsequent forcible incorporation into the United States in 1898. Such res-

titution should include all the lands presently set aside by the US government (nearly 1.5 million acres) for the use of Hawaiians, but not currently under native control; monies rendered in restitution for the original injury of the overthrow and annexation; and basic civil rights, including access to state and federal courts.

The two major and opposing groups engaged in these demands have been a state-created agency, the Office of Hawaiian Affairs (OHA), and a native initiative for self-government, Ka Lāhui Hawai'i.

OHA's position has been consistent since its creation in 1978. No lands are to be transferred to the Hawaiian people; the Hawaiian people are not to be allowed litigation rights; and no group apart from OHA is to represent the Hawaiian people. Only money in the form of a one-time cash payment from the state to the Office of Hawaiian Affairs is supported. Finally, any relationship of the Hawaiian people to the federal government is to be established through the Office of Hawaiian Affairs, allegedly the only official native organization.

OHA's position is problematic on several fronts. Despite its vociferous claims to speak for the national interests of the Hawaiian people, OHA has always represented the state of Hawai'i. This is hardly surprising since the organization is an official state agency whose political position adheres to that of the state Democratic Party.

In terms of its track record, OHA has already concluded an agreement with the state to settle for money rather than land regarding native lands held in

trust by the state. Simply put, this means not one acre of native land will go to the native people, many of whom are homeless. The state will continue to control the lands while a pittance will be paid into OHA coffers. Furthermore, OHA does not define or defend native sovereignty, preferring instead to maintain its parental ties to the state of Hawai'i.

Meanwhile, Ka Lāhui Hawai'i has defined sovereignty as the "ability of a people who share a common culture, religion, language, value system and land base, to exercise control over their lands and lives, independent of other nations." In political terms, Ka Lāhui argues that Hawaiians should be identified as native people (rather than merely individual citizens) with rights of inclusion in the US Federal policy on self-determination for native peoples. They would enjoy a "nation-to-nation" relationship with the American government. Such nation status would establish claims to self-government on an identifiable land base. With this status, Hawaiians would no longer be wards of the state and federal governments. The state of Hawai'i would not be our "parent" but a co-equal in a three-way relationship between the Hawaiian nation, the federal government, and the state of Hawai'i.

As public consciousness and support for this form of Hawaiian sovereignty increased steadily throughout 1992, it was obvious that Ka Lāhui Hawai'i had out-organized OHA at the community level. Calling for a large public march on 17 January 1993 to commemorate the overthrow of the Hawaiian government and to demand sovereignty, Ka Lāhui forced the issue of

land and government for the native people onto a very public platform. When fifteen thousand people peacefully demonstrated their support for sovereignty on the centennial day, OHA suddenly endorsed the concept of a "nation within a nation." Feeling overshadowed by Ka Lāhui, whose enrollment of citizens had soared to 15,000, OHA suddenly began speaking about "nationhood."

Sensing that the Democratic Party and OHA were losing control of the tide of public opinion, Governor Waihe'e and the OHA trustees teamed up with state politicians to submit a bill to the Hawai'i legislature calling for a state-controlled sovereignty constitutional convention (Con-Con). Praised by local media as a victory for Hawaiian self-determination, the bill actually placed the entire process in the hands of the governor, who is empowered to appoint nineteen sovereignty-commission members to determine all procedures for the Con-Con.

Since the bill created an undemocratic, top-down structure in which all authority rests with the state, Ka Lāhui Hawai'i and other sovereignty groups opposed it. Despite what the native people wanted, the bill passed into law and the governor selected commission members in August 1993.

While the state moved to foreclose native self-determination, international organizing by Hawaiians continued. Ka Lāhui joined with other independence groups to host an international tribunal in Hawai'i to bring charges of human rights violations against the United States. Experts on international law, including lawyers and scholars, aided Hawaiians in drafting submis-

sions to international forums to register human rights complaints against the United States.

Meanwhile, Hawaiian sovereignty leaders traveled to Vienna and Geneva to attend human rights conferences to present the case for self-determination. Finally, Ka Lāhui continued to inform the public about the latest Democratic Party efforts to short-circuit Hawaiian self-determination. Despite a racist press and massive state opposition to real native autonomy, critical Hawaiian voices were heard, if not heeded.

It is a supreme irony that after nearly two decades of organizing for self-government, the drive for Hawaiian sovereignty should have been stunted by a Hawaiian governor, Hawaiian legislators, and an all-native Office of Hawaiian Affairs. At this stage in our history, sell-out Hawaiians are everywhere. As if taking their cues from "government" Indians in the continental United States, Americanized Hawaiians have begun to sing the song of collaboration. In a year's time, Hawaiians will be faced with yet another obstacle to self-determination: a state-called constitutional convention.

HAUNANI-KAY TRASK

## MAORI ISSUES

The most momentous political event for Maori in 1992 was the signing of the Sealords deal in September between the Crown and Maori leaders. The Maori Fisheries Act 1989, which established the Maori Fisheries Commission, and returned 10 percent of the fishing quota to Maori, was only a partial settlement of the Maori fisheries

claim to 50 percent of the quota. The battle for the remaining 40 percent continued out of public view.

In a memorandum to the Cabinet Strategy Committee, minister of justice Douglas Graham recommended a change of approach in dealing with Maori treaty claims (New Zealand 1992, 11–15). Previous governments were unwilling to concede that breaches of the Treaty of Waitangi had occurred. This saw the Crown losing a succession of ten major court cases. With the inclusion of treaty clauses, or references to the treaty, in twenty-one general statutes, litigating treaty claims would more than likely cause further embarrassment to the Crown, as well as incur unnecessary legal expenses for both parties.

Instead of resisting treaty claims in court, the minister advocated a policy of “chiefs meeting with chiefs.” The minister of justice, supported by an “A team” of chief executives and top officials, would meet with the principal claimants to work out agreements for settlement. In the case of the fisheries claim, the four chief litigants were designated by the government as Maori negotiators. This precluded other leaders, irrespective of their *mana* or tribal claims, from the fisheries negotiations. The Tribal Congress was also precluded, thereby creating potential division in Maori ranks.

The Maori negotiators knew the government wanted to win electoral favor by resolving Maori treaty claims before the turn of the century. To this end a global settlement was needed. When corporate giant Carter Holt signalled the sale of its Sealord subsidiary for NZ\$375 million, the negotiators

struck a deal with the Crown. The government agreed to put up NZ\$150 million to finance Maori into a joint venture with Brierly Investments to purchase Sealords. With the deal went 20 percent of the quota on all new species. In return, Maori would make no more commercial claims to fisheries under the Treaty of Waitangi. Written into the Deed of Settlement between *iwi* ‘tribes’ and the Crown was a clause whereby the government would repeal Section 88(2) of the Fisheries Act 1983 which recognized Maori fishing rights guaranteed by the Treaty of Waitangi.

The Sealords deal exemplified the politics of power, pragmatism, and political expedience. For the government, NZ\$150 million was a small price to pay for regaining control over the threat to national stability posed by Maori treaty claims. When an agreement in principle was reached, the negotiators went around the tribes seeking a mandate for what was in effect a *fait accompli*. The agreement was characterized by one negotiator as “the only deal in town.” The issues raised by tribes opposed to the deal were not fully debated because of the desire to avoid losing the opportunity to another bidder. Instead, tribal leaders were invited to the Beehive (Parliament) to sign the Deed of Settlement. They were given an hour or so to read the 26-page deed, understand its political and economic implications, and sign it on behalf of their *iwi*. This procedure was a complete negation of tribal decision-making by consensus.

There were ninety-three signatures on the Deed of Settlement. This was a long way short of the 540 signatures on the Treaty of Waitangi, a part of which

the deed would supersede. For an official document, the method of signing was not rigorous or systematic. The deed was between the Crown and *iwi*, but the six leading signatories are designated Maori negotiators. The *iwi* that they represented did not appear beside their names. Six other signatures appeared without *iwi* designations.

There were also multiple signings of the deed by three signatories. One man signed twice, once as a negotiator, and once on behalf of the Tribal Congress. This paralleled the action of Chief Te Rauparaha, who signed the original Treaty of Waitangi twice. But the deed goes one better by collecting the signatures of two men three times. One signed on behalf of his tribe, and on behalf of two others who were not represented. Sir Graham Latimer signed as a Maori negotiator, president of the Maori Council, and litigant in the Maori fisheries claim.

Eighteen signatures were designated plaintiffs in the fisheries claim. Others signed on behalf of *waka* 'canoe confederations', tribal trust boards, and *runanga* 'multi-tribal councils'. Two signatories were wrongly classified as negotiators. There were twenty-one illegible signatures, indicating a lack of precision in the execution of the deed. In other cases, the names were specified in print script beside the signatures. One of the signatories identified himself as Tuwharetoa, a tribe with no access to the sea.

Given the flaws identified in the deed, and minimum time for debating it on tribal *marae*, it was not surprising that thirteen tribes, including the Moriori of the Chatham Islands, opposed the deed. They took out an

injunction in the High Court against it. Justice Heron denied the injunction on the ground that the deed cast obligations only on those who signed it. The case went to the Appeal Court where it was dismissed by Sir Robin Cooke, who ruled that Parliament was free to enact legislation on the lines envisaged in the deed (*New Zealand Herald*, 4 Nov 1992).

Chair of the Tribal Congress Api-rana Mahuika sided with the dissenting tribes. He warned that the issue would come back to haunt the government. It happened sooner than expected. Six Maori members of Parliament, two of them on the government's side, opposed the Sealord's Settlement Bill when it was introduced in the house. There was further embarrassment when Tamati Reedy, a member of the Tribal Congress, pleaded at the United Nations for an investigation into violations of indigenous rights by the New Zealand government.

RANGINUI WALKER

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### NiUE

The dominance of Niue's politics by Sir Robert Rex came to an end with his death on 13 December 1992 after a prolonged illness. Leader of Government Business prior to self-government, he served as premier from 1974 until his death. He had attended the first meeting of the South Pacific Forum in 1971,

as well as many other regional conferences.

Tributes came from around the Pacific, while Niueans paid their respects at an all-night vigil. The state funeral—Niue's first—was attended by virtually the entire population of Niue, as well as representatives from New Zealand and Australia. A public holiday was observed on 18 December, and memorial services were held at the Town Hall in Auckland, where many Niueans live, and in Wellington, New Zealand's capital.

Young Vivian, who had served as acting premier during Rex's illness, was elected premier by the Niue Assembly on 22 December. The opposition declined to put up a candidate with a general election only two months away. The main issues, the economy and unemployment, were ones on which the Rex-Vivian government had experienced setbacks. In late November Vivian had been forced to withdraw a tax proposal that would have added 5 percent to the cost of all goods and services. The bill, an important part of a package offering lower income-tax rates as well as increased pensions and child benefits, had been presented as a further step toward restructuring Niue's economy away from dependence on New Zealand aid.

Difficulties had also persisted with Niue's air services. Following the collapse of arrangements with Auckland-based Niue Airlines, the government was compelled to charter Polynesian Airlines (at NZ\$90,000 per flight) to fly between Niue and Auckland. Subsequently Niue accepted Air Nauru's proposal of scheduled services to New

Zealand and Fiji, with Polynesian Airlines providing a link to the Cook Islands and Western Samoa (and from there to Australia). This arrangement faltered when Air Nauru's premiere flights were cancelled due to a dispute between Nauru and Fijian authorities over air traffic rights, an impasse which Vivian claimed had to be solved by the Fiji and Nauru governments.

The 27 February election, which brought the Rex era formally to an end, saw a record number of candidates (24) nominated for the six island-wide common roll seats. Nine of the fourteen village constituencies were contested, including that of Premier Vivian, who had run unopposed in the previous election. Four candidates competed for Sir Robert's Alofi South seat, including the late Premier's youngest son, John Rex.

The 91 percent voter turnout was down slightly from 1990, and the results, particularly for the common-roll seats, showed clear signs of disappointment with government performance. There seemed little doubt that many Niueans desired a break with the political past. Sir Robert's widow, Lady Patricia Rex, once the island's highest vote winner, lost her seat in the 20-member Niue Assembly. Her son John won only 13 percent of the votes in Alofi South. Her eldest son, Robert, narrowly retained his seat.

Others closely associated with the outgoing government also did poorly. Common-roll member and cabinet minister Fisa Pihigia failed to win reelection. Terry Chapman, secretary to government for eighteen years and considered by some to be a likely premier, was unable to win a seat in the



assembly. By contrast, government opponents polled well. Independent O'love Tauveve Jacobsen was re-elected, as was Sani Lakatani, the leader of a faction separate from the Rex "establishment." Another member of Lakatani's Atuhau Tupuhake "The Coming Generation" group, Poni Kapaga, also won a common roll seat.

The poll was topped by a political newcomer (543 votes) with a famous name—Michael Jackson—and a widely shared Niuean predicament. A former public servant, Jackson had been made redundant as a result of budgetary pressures associated with declining levels of New Zealand assistance. When the government printing office was privatized, Jackson lost his job but displayed his entrepreneurial skills by leasing the equipment and establishing himself as the island's only printer.

Another newcomer to the Niue Assembly was Terry Coe, an independent and the principal of Niue High School. He received the third-highest number of votes, gaining a victory which represented a new departure for Niue's politics. It was the first time that a *palagi* 'European' had gained elective office.

The results in the remaining fourteen seats, one for each of Niue's village constituencies, were also noteworthy. Both Premier Vivian and leadership contender Frank Lui won reelection, while the Alofi South seat was taken by Tukala Hekau, an old adversary only narrowly defeated by Robert Rex three years ago. In another constituency, its size indicative of Niue's depopulation in recent years, each candidate received forty-six votes.

Following a judicial recount, which confirmed the result, the incumbent was defeated when the election was decided by drawing lots.

On 12 March the assembly elected forty-seven-year-old Lui as Niue's third premier in three months. In 1990 he had lost his cabinet post after failing to oust Sir Robert from office. A member of the assembly for twenty-seven of the past thirty years, he defeated Vivian 11-9 on the first ballot, and immediately sought to demonstrate his commitment to change by the character of his cabinet appointments.

Although Lui and Finance Minister Lakatani had served before, the remaining two positions were allocated to newcomers. As a result Niue had its first woman minister, Jacobsen, and in Coe its first minister of non-Niuean descent. One experienced former cabinet minister bypassed by Lui, Tama Posimani, resigned from the assembly in May, giving the 104 registered voters in his village of Tuapa an opportunity to give a verdict on the new government's performance. By that stage the Lui team was finding progress toward its goals far from straightforward.

The policy of increasing local production and employment opportunities through private sector investment, begun under the previous government, was proving difficult to implement. Record shipments of coconuts and taro produced a glut on the market, depressing prices and leading to losses by growers, exporters, and distributors. In May a glove-making factory, operated by a New Zealand company, closed down, with a loss of twenty-three jobs. A privatized sawmill was also experiencing difficulties. The eco-

conomic problems were having an effect on the government's policies and credibility.

Lakitani apologized to the people for the island's economic problems, and acknowledged that the government lacked the funds needed to meet its social and economic responsibilities. Although the previous year's budget deficit had been reduced from US\$1 million to a projected US\$500,000, public servants and old-age pensioners could not expect to receive a promised 12-percent cost-of-living allowance during 1993-94. In May the finance minister admitted that further reductions in the size of the public service were likely. During the same month petrol prices rose by 12 percent, an increase designed to raise funds to replace aging power generators, provide for road maintenance, and repair a bulk-fuel depot.

Not surprisingly Lui's first overseas visit was to New Zealand, where he spoke to Niueans living in Auckland and encouraged them to return home. Changes to New Zealand legislation made this a more attractive option, as Niueans returning to the island to retire (after forty or more years in New Zealand) were able (from 1 July 1993) to receive 100 percent of their New Zealand superannuation benefits. As part of a ten-year plan to double Niue's population the premier offered "come home" incentives for returning Niueans, including renovations to the approximately 360 empty houses on the island. More fancifully, Lui appealed to New Zealand pensioners to consider spending their winters on Niue. Although land could not be purchased, the premier noted the availabil-

ity of sixty-year leases on bungalows in some villages.

In talks with the New Zealand government, the premier attempted to avert further aid cuts. New Zealand agreed to maintain its level of support at NZ\$7 million for 1993-94 (NZ\$5 million in budgetary support, NZ\$2 million for special projects), but a 1992-93 budgetary supplement of NZ\$500,000 was not extended for another year.

Attempts to upgrade Niue's international status continued. Some of these were symbolic, others potentially more substantive. New Zealand agreed that the office of its representative on Niue would become a high commission, a rank normally reserved for an independent state which is a member of the Commonwealth. As anticipated by the constitutional amendment approved in 1992, responsibility for the public service was transferred from New Zealand to Niue. In their joint statement on the New Zealand-Niue relationship (Levine 1993, 159-160), the two parties emphasized that New Zealand's acceptance of certain defense and foreign affairs responsibilities did "not confer on the New Zealand Government any rights of control," a point underscored with the visit to Niue in July 1992 of the USS *Racine*.

There were also some promising economic indicators. In June, agreement was reached with Fiji, allowing Air Nauru to carry passengers from Niue to Fiji on a weekly direct flight aimed at boosting tourism and facilitating contact with Fiji-based regional organizations. Despite uncertainties associated with air services, the tour-

ism and marketing board claimed that the number of visitors was three times greater in the first quarter of 1993 than twelve months earlier. More dramatically, the growth in revenue from tourism had increased fivefold during the period.

There were plans to transform the government administration center into a shopping complex, a project to be funded by the island's Development Finance Committee. A television and radio studio was being built with Australian support, permitting the island to develop its own broadcasting facilities. The first private enterprise newspaper, the *Niue Star*, was launched in 1993, backed by printer-publisher Michael Jackson. An initiative by a Catholic priest, Father Glover, developed into a small, environmentally friendly industry, as Niue shipped its empty aluminum cans to New Zealand and its bottles to Western Samoa.

In Tuapa, however, the judgment on the government's efforts was far from favorable. The by-election saw an experienced member of the Young Vivian camp, Fisa Pihigia, win the seat, capitalizing on antigovernment sentiment stemming largely from economic difficulties. The result left the government in a precarious position, its fragile one-seat majority jeopardized by unattractive options and significant economic constraints.

STEPHEN LEVINE

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### TOKELAU

Moves toward self-government gathered momentum during 1992-93, as steps were taken to introduce cabinet-style political institutions. The August 1992 general *fono*, held on Atafu, decided to establish a Council of *Faipule* to govern Tokelau when the *fono* is not in session. While this decision formally recognized what was already taking place, an entirely new initiative (adopted at the same time) saw the establishment of a new position, *Ulu-O-Tokelau* (head of Tokelau), to be rotated annually among the three *faipule*. As Tokelau's acquisition of the administrative and political institutions associated with a national entity becomes more complete, New Zealand is expected to take formal action assigning the powers of its administrator to the Council of *Faipule* and the general *fono*.

Nonetheless Tokelau remained on the United Nations' list of eighteen dependencies whose final political status was still to be determined. In May the Council of *Faipule* stressed once again Tokelau's desire to preserve its close political relationship with New Zealand. A subsequent statement sent to the UN Committee of Twenty-Four (on decolonization) emphasized Tokelau's preference for finding its own solutions to problems of political, economic, and social development, one balancing responsibility for the management of its own affairs with ongoing programs of support from New Zealand.

Speaking at a UN-sponsored seminar in June in Port Moresby, a New Zealander with considerable experi-

ence of Pacific legal and constitutional affairs, Alison Quentin-Baxter, identified "sustained autonomy" as a new political status applicable to Tokelau. This model provided for "local responsibility for political decision-making to the full extent desired by the people of the island or island group" as well as indefinite support "from an outside source." Although perhaps not specifically drafted with Tokelau in mind, the broad principles involved corresponded closely to political developments there.

Speaking at the same conference, Tokelau's new administrator, New Zealand career diplomat Lindsay Watt, who had been appointed in February, emphasized the distinctive partnership between Tokelau and New Zealand. He stressed New Zealand's willingness to maintain ties with (and support for) Tokelau so long as this was desired by the people of Tokelau. He also drew attention to Tokelau's "new political framework in the national sense," a theme taken up in a statement to the seminar by Tokelau's first *Ulu*, Sale-sio Lui.

The United Nations Decade of Decolonization, with its timetable for an end to colonialism by the year 2000, has given New Zealand and Tokelau more opportunities to defend, and describe, their relationship. Watt, noting that "New Zealand had governed Tokelau with a very light hand," pointed out that "at no time has the administering power established a physical presence in Tokelau." Lui told the gathering that "Tokelau treasures its relationship with New Zealand" and he expressed his appreciation for "New Zealand's willingness to allow Tokelau to continue the process of

development in its own way, and at its own pace."

Encouragement for a more flexible UN approach to decolonization outcomes could be inferred from comments from its secretary-general, who suggested that the organization should consider new ideas and solutions for the very small nations remaining on its list of non-self-governing territories. Concerns about international perceptions led to a New Zealand invitation (which was endorsed by the Council of *Faipule*) for a UN Mission to come to Tokelau during 1994 to "obtain first-hand information" about developments there. The Tokelauan leadership is expected to impress upon observers the need to preserve the idea of a choice for entities, such as Tokelau, not subscribing to the view of full independence as the only or most legitimate goal for all states and peoples.

On Tokelau's three atolls the policies agreed to at the August 1992 *fono* were consolidated. Planning for the relocation of the Tokelau public service, from its Apia headquarters to Tokelau itself, moved forward. This will involve the transfer of key functions and personnel, including the directors of all six government departments, in all likelihood two per atoll. In mid-June the New Zealand State Services Commissioner delegated his powers over the Tokelau Public Service to two Commissioners, Michael Collins and a Tokelauan counterpart (not yet appointed). This was an interim arrangement until the establishment of the Independent Tokelau Commission, which will act as the employer for Tokelau's public service. The relocation of services from Western Samoa and the reallocation of supervisory

authority from New Zealand continue a step-by-step process enhancing Tokelau's ability to make and implement decisions about its own affairs, supported by external assistance.

New Zealand's aid to Tokelau for 1992-93 remained at the same level as previously, while the shared commitment to the relocation of the public service was evident in the appointment of Bryan Lawrence, previously in the Wellington office of the administrator (and earlier in the Office of Tokelau Affairs in Apia) as transition manager and acting official secretary for a twelve-month period. The post of official secretary, held for many years by Casimilo Perez, is being disestablished, with the Office of Tokelau Affairs being replaced by a smaller Apia-based liaison unit when the relocation to Tokelau takes place. An Office of the Council of *Faipule* is also being set up, located on Tokelau, with administrative staff to support the *faipule*, provide a secretariat for the general *fono*, and assist with financial management and budgetary planning. It is expected that, at least at the outset, its director will be located on the same island as the *Ulu*, making for a three-year rotation among Tokelau's three atoll groups.

These changes, with those adopted earlier, enhance the scope for control by Tokelauans, in Tokelau, over Tokelauan affairs. In this respect the decisions about political and administrative matters complement each other. The Council of *Faipule* is expected to assume greater responsibilities with the relocation of the public service headquarters to Tokelauan soil. At that time, each *faipule* will perform ministerial-type functions, with responsibili-

ties for public service "portfolios" situated on the island on which a *faipule* resides. This attempt to blend a Westminster concept of ministerial responsibility with the realities of island life in a multi-atoll context demonstrates a necessary degree both of creativity and pragmatism.

In this effort, respect for Tokelau's traditional values remains paramount. The *fono* has identified these forms of development as consistent with what it regards as Tokelau's strengths, "the family, the atoll and the community." In the administrator's view, prospects for "establishing a viable national government" depend on the model of governance "expanding the values of sharing and cooperation which have their institutional base in the villages." A concept which empowers Tokelauans while recognizing economic and geographic realities, symbolized by the phrase "independence through interdependence," has won broad acceptance.

Transition and change were characteristics of Tokelau's January 1993 elections as well, with only one of the three *faipule* (Salesio Lui, of Nukunonu) being reelected. Keli Neemia was elected *faipule* on Fakaofu, while on Atafu the position was won by Lepaio Simi. Together they comprise the newly organized Council of *Faipule*, with Lui (by virtue of seniority) becoming the first *Ulu-O-Tokelau*.

These election results extended earlier voting trends towards a younger and better educated leadership with wider experience. Lui, forty-two years old, is a teacher with a degree from the University of the South Pacific, as is Simi, who is in his mid-forties. The eldest of the three, Keli Neemia, fifty-two (younger than the *faipule* he defeated),

was formerly a village constable and secretary to Fakaofu's Council of Elders.

Similar outcomes occurred in the *pulenuku* elections, held immediately following the announcement of the *faipule* results. In these elections only one incumbent (Lui Kelekolio, on Fakaofu) won reelection. On Nukunonu the position was won by Ioane Tumua, a teacher (and deputy principal) who was a candidate younger than the person he defeated. On Atafu, Amusia Patea, who had returned to the island after living in New Zealand for six years, was defeated as *faipule*, but subsequently elected *pulenuku*.

Some economic initiatives also took place. Tokelau's balance of payments was likely to benefit from increased sales of stamps to collectors, with anticipated revenues of around NZ\$200,000 per year. Receipts from fishing in 1992 were substantially over the norm, exceeding NZ\$1 million. Development priorities continued to focus on telecommunications and ongoing projects, including the repair of Tokelau's sea walls.

STEPHEN LEVINE

### THE KINGDOM OF TONGA

The state and the churches once again became embroiled during the year as supporters sought to better define and organize the prodemocracy movement as a politically and socially influential tool. The movement has been gathering support over the last few years among the better educated members of the commoner electorate and smaller independent entrepreneurs, especially

in Tongatapu. When it was formally established in August 1992, the leading positions on the committee were taken by church people, whose increasing support for the thrust towards greater democracy was also apparent in outspoken public statements and writings. Seluini Akau'ola, Roman Catholic priest and pastor of the nation's capital, Nuku'alofa, became the first chair of the committee. In his absence, Reverend Simote Ve'a from the Free Wesleyan Church has been the acting chair.

The Convention on the Constitution and Democracy, which had been widely mooted for some months, became the movement's first project and was staged in the basilica of the Catholic cathedral in Nuku'alofa in November 1992. For four days, Tongan churchpeople, scholars, educators, and others spoke to an audience of several hundred people about issues of social justice and political reform. Most speakers advocated moderation, slow growth of democratic institutions, and political change through education. In the absence of members of the government and representatives of the monarch, no amendments to the constitution could be made. Thus the convention became largely an educational exercise, with teachers and reformers instructing the people about peaceful change and democracy. It was opened by active spokesperson for reform and former head of the Free Wesleyan Church Reverend Dr 'Amanaki Havea, and was closed by the Roman Catholic Bishop of all Tonga and Niue, Patelisio Finau, who continues to campaign strongly for greater social justice and democracy in Tonga.



Influential academics such as Dr Epeli Hau'ofa, Dr 'Ana Taufe'ulungaki, Futa Helu, and churchmen such as Dr Sione Latukefu, Dr 'Amanaki Havea, and Siupeli Talai spoke of the need for change, the kinds of change desirable, and the need for patience. Democracy may appeal philosophically to a few, but is poorly understood by the mass of the electorate, and opposed by a powerful social and political elite. The convention helped to polarize the opposition, with the Minister of Police denying foreigners entry to the country to attend the convention, banning foreign journalists, and even threatening to revoke the visa of an outspoken Tongan participant traveling on an American passport.

The constitutional convention marked the beginning of intense preparation for the February 1993 elections. Conservative elements, represented by the cabinet and the nobles' representatives in Parliament, attempted to divide church support for democracy by asking church leaders to find less radical candidates for the commoners' votes in the election. Prime Minister Baron Vaea called together cabinet ministers and church leaders to discuss the formation of a Christian Democratic Party, working on the principle that if you can't beat them, appear to join them. But no one was fooled, and neither move came to anything. The conservatives finally had to return nine noble candidates, some of whom entered Parliament for the first time and are, if anything, more politically conservative than their predecessors.

In the prodemocracy camp, matters did not always proceed smoothly

either. Laki Niu split publicly with 'Akilisi Pohiva over the latter's plans to form a political party that would consolidate the prodemocracy vote in Parliament. Also, although Niu wanted political reform, he believed that Tonga should not elect its leaders democratically, and opposed leaders who wanted democracy at all costs. The lack of coordination among prodemocracy parliamentarians meant that Pohiva and Uiliami Fukofuka were the only truly outspoken representatives of the movement in the final sessions of the outgoing Parliament. The prodemocracy sitting members ran as independents, and Niu lost his seat.

Because six of the nine representatives returned by the people were identified as prodemocracy candidates, some have seen a definite call for change in the results of the 1993 election. However, the results were equivocal. Despite winning 56 percent of the overall vote, prodemocracy parliamentarians have no party, no platform, and are unlikely to vote together. Given the degree of ambivalence and confusion surrounding the key issues, it is difficult to estimate the movement's strength, or to predict what its representatives could achieve even if they remained united. In the present system, they are heavily outnumbered by noble representatives and members of cabinet.

While Pohiva and Fukofuka retained their seats as representatives for Tongatapu with overwhelming majorities, the sitting prodemocracy members in the Ha'apai and Vava'u constituencies were replaced by new members who professed to be reformist. An

incoming member for Vava'u, who had been in Parliament between 1966 and 1986, and was returned on a reformist ticket, stated after the elections that 60 percent of the Vava'u electorate do not comprehend the pros and cons of democracy. While he was prodemocracy, he would not support the introduction of full democracy or party politics to Tonga (*Tonga Chronicle*, 11 Feb 1993, 2, 8). The dissension against the *status quo* expressed in the anonymity of the private ballot was qualified or contradicted by opinions for which people might be held responsible.

The movement remained strongest in Tongatapu. Pohiva continued to press for the publication of confidential information regarding government finances and argued, with some success, that the freedom of the press should be protected, as stated in the constitution. The success of some reformist goals, however, should not be confused with a desire for western-style democracy. Much of the popular support for Pohiva and Fukofuka in Tongatapu came from rural areas. This may be interpreted as populist support for parliamentarians who are willing to fight the system in ways that ordinary people can, or dare, not. But this support can also be related to sectional economic interests. In recent years, the success of commercial farming in Tongatapu, especially the export of pumpkin squash to Japan, has aggravated problems of land shortage and insecurity of tenure which the government has failed to address constructively. Small commercial farmers have also encountered difficulties marketing their squash through the seven compa-

nies which have been granted export quotas. Many of these companies are controlled by members of the aristocracy and wealthy business people. Support for Pohiva and other prodemocracy parliamentarians may be one way small farmers can protest the way they have been treated by the companies. But this support does not necessarily indicate support for broader democratic ideals. Uncertainty about the outcome of political reforms, or a desire for some reform without threatening the monarchy and the present three-tiered system of rank in government (consisting of monarch, nobles, and the people), is perhaps why there was a poorer voter turnout in 1993 than in the previous two elections.

Progovernment conservatives, such as 'Eseta Fusitu'a, deputy secretary to the cabinet and wife of the noble Speaker of the House, maintained that the majority of the electorate voted against the reformists. They interpreted this as a vote for the establishment or, at least, as a win for both sides and not a landslide victory for the prodemocracy movement. Mrs Fusitu'a pointed out that while the prodemocracy parliamentarians won all three seats on Tongatapu, their total vote dropped, while that of the pro-status quo candidates increased by 50 percent to capture 60 percent of the total vote. With a voter turnout of only 59 percent overall, the results cannot be seen as a mandate for democratic reform. However, the government is also clearly on the defensive. A new government information office has been set up, and has acquired radio time for Mrs Fusitu'a to explain its actions to the nation. The cabinet also

began to reactivate local government to improve its image and communications with village people. The police minister continued to speak against the prodemocracy supporters in his weekly column in the government-run newspaper the *Tonga Chronicle*, and has even threatened them with violence. After the election he wrote "The continual sly hints of corruption and dishonesty against His Majesty's Government without proof is going to rebound with multiple traumatic consequences on those concerned" (*Tonga Chronicle*, 11 Feb 1993, 3).

In addition, not all members of the churches are behind their leaders' call for political reform. People have asked that church newspapers omit political comment and concentrate only on the teachings of the gospel and church news. An advisor is to be appointed to counsel Free Wesleyan Church members regarding the denomination's official stands on political and social issues (*Tonga Chronicle*, 20 May 1993, 5). The Mormon Church has never supported the prodemocratic position. The government also points to the fact that the Tonga National Council of Churches did not officially participate in the constitutional convention, because one of its four member churches (Roman Catholic, Free Wesleyan, Anglican, and Free Constitutional Church of Tonga) did not wish to do so. Members of all these churches attended as individuals, but the council as an entity was not represented. Other letters to the press indicate a country very much divided on whether to move towards reform or to fight, literally, to retain the present system. Many Tongans feel that moves towards

democracy are disrespectful to the monarch and nobles, and threaten Tonga's heritage. The prodemocracy supporters are equally convinced that steps forward can be made peacefully by a gradual education of the electorate. The increasing number of non-government controlled newsheets, papers, and magazines launched in Tonga play an important role in increasing people's awareness of significant issues. Several popular leaders have emerged. But the cabinet together with the nobles' representatives still controls the majority in Parliament, and the king retains the power to create ministers of state who will support the oligarchy. It is difficult, therefore, to see how democratic change might occur in the foreseeable future, except by royal fiat which would imply an emphatic change of royal heart. The present situation, which is one of stalemate, shows that the prodemocracy movement still has a lot of educating to do.

KERRY JAMES

#### WALLIS AND FUTUNA

The major event of the period under review was the earthquake that shook the island of Futuna during the night of 12 March 1993. The quake, which registered 6.5 on the Richter scale, caused the death of three people and substantial damage to the island. Land and rock slides blocked off some of the roads, complicating the task of the relief operations launched from Wallis and New Caledonia. Public utilities were heavily disrupted. Power and telephone lines were restored quickly, but

the water distribution network took much longer to repair. By the end of June, Futuna was still without running water. Buildings were also severely damaged. While traditional *fale*-style houses, which still represent a sizable percentage of the total, withstood the shock rather well, western-style buildings fared worse. Concrete structures fractured, and dressed stone buildings (primarily churches, chapels, and mission buildings dating back to the last century) collapsed partially or completely. Many contemporary dwellings are raised on short stilts, and some of these suffered a similar fate. The initial quake was followed by a series of secondary tremors, registering up to 4.5 on the Richter scale, which completed the destruction of some of the already damaged structures. The total damage has been estimated at over US\$14 million. During his visit to the territory in June 1993, Minister for Overseas Territories Dominique Perben announced a government grant of approximately US\$4 million for the rebuilding of Futuna. The government had already allocated an initial US\$40,000 for emergency measures immediately after the quake. One of the consequences of the earthquake will be felt for a long time to come: the extensive reef flats which line the south and south west coasts were raised by about half a meter. At high tide, the sea no longer reaches what used to be the shoreline.

On the political front, the period was marked by two national elections. On 20 September 1992, voters in Wallis and Futuna cast their ballots in the national referendum on the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty on European unity. Representative Kamilo Gata

campaigned for a yes vote, in line with the policy of his political allies in metropolitan France, *Mouvement des Radicaux de Gauche* (the MRG, which regrouped the left under the banner of President François Mitterrand, and at the time represented the majority in the national assembly). The yes vote was also supported by the nonaligned president of the Territorial Assembly, Soane Uhila, and by the assembly's economic and social advisor, Gaston Lutui. The representatives of the two major parties in the then opposition in metropolitan France, Senator Papilio Makape (of the *Rassemblement pour la République*, or RPR) and Basile Tui, the local leader of the *Union des Français* (UDF), campaigned in favour of the no vote, even though on the national scene the UDF had endorsed the yes vote and the RPR had given out mixed signals. Basile Tui was concerned about the effect for the territory of the clause in the treaty concerning the freedom of movement of peoples and goods, while Senator Makape was more anxious to denounce the government's actions, which he judged negative for Wallis and Futuna. The yes vote won the day, with 76.54 percent of the ballots cast. Vote participation was low—54.4 percent—yet significantly higher than that for New Caledonia, and much higher than for French Polynesia.

Elections for the representative to the French National Assembly were held in March 1993. There were three candidates in the first round of voting on 21 March. Previous President of the Territorial Assembly Clovis Logologo-falau had been endorsed by the *Union pour la France* party, an election coalition between RPR and UDF. Also run-

ning were the incumbent Kamilo Gata, MRG party, and the nonaligned Soane Uhila, president of the Territorial Assembly. Kamilo Gata carried the first round with 45.64 percent of the vote. Clovis Logologofalau received 37.8 percent, and Soane Uhila 16.54 percent. For the second round, Soane Uhila withdrew and endorsed Logologofalau, who also received support from political allies in New Caledonia, and a special campaign visit by a metropolitan RPR senator. Nevertheless, Kamilo Gata was able to keep his lead and won the day with 52.41 percent of the vote. The voters of Wallis and Futuna apparently broke with established tradition, whereby they consistently voted for dominant political groupings in metropolitan France, and cast their ballots—with an unusually high participation rate of 88.8 percent of voters—on the basis of purely local issues.

The majority coalition between MRG and nonaligned members of the territorial assembly, which had made possible the 1992 election of the nonaligned Soane Uhila as president, quickly showed signs of breaking apart. In the very first extraordinary session of the assembly MRG representatives joined forces with members of the RPR for the vote on a bill concerning child welfare. By the end of June 1993, the nine RPR representatives had formed a coalition with Soane Uhila's five nonaligned members to command a majority. Representative Kamilo Gata, who had waged a serious battle against his former ally Soane Uhila during the national legislative election campaign, proposed that the presidency of the assembly be given to the RPR group,

but met with little support. The new president will be elected during the budget session, scheduled for the fourth quarter of 1993.

The labor unrest of the previous year continued with a series of similar strike actions. Most of these occurred during the second half of 1992, and affected the offices of weather and civil aviation, and departments of health and education. The main complaint continued to concern the recognition of local career employees in the various departments as full-fledged members of the national French civil service.

The Catholic mission and the traditional chiefly hierarchy, the twin pillars of Wallisian and Futunan society, came under strong criticism from the secretary-general of the major labor union in the territory, the local chapter of the *Force Ouvrière*. At the fourth convention of *Force Ouvrière* in Noumea, he blamed them for the economic stagnation affecting the territory, and called for the liberation of the population from their authority.

The gradual increase in the number of wage earners in the population continued to alter the face of society. Salaried employment grew slower overall than in the two previous years, but remained high (22.8 percent) in the private sector. The shift from public to private sectors continued. In 1992, the private sector accounted for 42 percent of wage earners, compared to 17 percent in 1986 and 37.7 percent in 1991. Of the 1066 public servants in the territory in 1992, 837 were locally recruited and 229 were sent from metropolitan France.

FRANÇOIS SODTER

### WESTERN SAMOA

The year 1992–93 was one for trade missions and establishing sister city relationships. One such relationship was initiated between Maclean Shire in New South Wales, Australia, and Apia. Population was predicted to double to 313,981 by the year 2021. There were setbacks. The Washington embassy, opened with fanfare in 1990, and blighted by financial mismanagement, was closed during the year and its functions resumed by the New York office.

Current and former lands and survey ministers exchanged abuse in Parliament over whose wife had what store in the new market. Parliamentary Speaker Afamasaga Fatu Vaili stepped in and separated the two. Later, he blew the whistle on Ulualofaiga Talamai Nika for upsetting standing orders as the latter tried fielding a question on the 1992–93 budget. Nine months later, Afamasaga clashed with Prime Minister Tofilau. With Parliament in disarray, he adjourned April's session weeping. The prime minister battled on. His ruling Human Right Protection (HRPP) government had pushed through constitutional changes in 1991, increasing parliament's term from three to five years, and cabinet by four ministers. Factionalism struck with members of Parliament threatening to withdraw support if passed over for the cabinet. For the fifth or sixth time, Tofilau announced his resignation and the herd laughed and regrouped.

The churches had more than religious instruction in their minds. The Baha'i got together women from the

two Samoas for a three-day national conference. Coordinator Foisaga Eteuati-Shon discussed grass-root women and the economy, while the University of the South Pacific's Tuala Tiresa Malietoa stressed women, culture, and environment. Methodists discussed ways of aligning monetary policies with modern economic practices at their annual conference in July.

Tiava'asue Falefatu Sapolu, a lawyer in private practice, was chosen as chief justice in July 1992. No stranger in judicial circles, he had served as acting Chief Justice, and two terms as attorney general, in 1983–85 and 1988–90. In 1990, he held both positions and still managed to find time for his private practice. Blood ties in small Island communities run deep, particularly in high places. Tiava'asue succeeded his brother-in-law and acting Chief Justice Richard B. Lussick, married to Katalina Sapolu. His blood and professional ties further increased the backlog of cases because of conflicts of interest. In some cases, he was involved at different times as defense counsel, government prosecutor, and judge.

Western Samoa Trust Estates Corporation, once the country's largest primary producer, continued to struggle with its bills. It was left with a six-thousand-acre plantation in Mulifanua, another twenty-five acres at Nu'u, a soap factory and abattoir at Vailele (*Samoa Times*, 18 Sept 1992). Revenue from lease of land now reverts to the Samoa Land Corporation, formed in 1990, which may soon demand rent from the Trust Estates Corporation. With cocoa production down since 1990, and full coconut production still months away, a no-sale policy was



imposed on livestock to build up the herd.

Import substitution, expansion, and diversification remained catchwords. For 1991, combined export earnings were WS\$16.54 million. Tourism earned WS\$34 million, double that of all other exports. On the debit side, imports of industrial supplies cost WS\$78.1 million. Tourism was boosted with an inaugural Teuila Festival, complete with a New Zealand-inspired flea market and a ten-year development plan. Samoa's distinctive culture is on sale, with plans to improve access to some 320 remote villages.

Greater access to customary lands for investment purposes, especially in promoting public infrastructure for tourism, was planned. The idea was that government would lease land from customary landowners, to be subleased to investors for commercial development. Investors would deal with one central authority, thus protecting landowner's interests and speeding up negotiations (*Samoa Observer*, 4 June 1993).

Two New Zealand-generated trust funds dominated the headlines in March and April 1993. The first involved funds for victims of Cyclone Val collected by Samoans in New Zealand, and matched dollar-for-dollar by the New Zealand government. Having raised WS\$1.8m from a telethon, the community leaders decided to bypass the Apia government and go straight to the districts. But things went sour. While the country picked up with New Zealand assistance, the committee embarked on a course of self-destruction (*Savali*, 22 April 1993).

In April, the second scandal sur-

facled. Attorney-General Le'aupepe Sanerive Muli'aumaseali'i resigned when found guilty on four charges of professional misconduct. The charges related to trust accounts totalling more than US\$61,000 at his Auckland law practice, which he ran from 1982-1991. He was a ranking *matai*, and most of his clients were Samoans.

Tupa'i Se Apa succeeded Le'aupepe as attorney general. He was public trustee for five years before setting up a law partnership with Tuala Karanita Enari, the country's first local and highly respected secretary to government in the early 1970s.

With New Zealand assistance, two electronic beams landed in Apia during May; a set of traffic lights and a television station. Television Western Samoa was launched on 29 May replete with *lotu* and *lauga* from leaders of the two Samoas. On 'Upolu, transmission extends east to Lufilufi and west to Falelatai and the eastern coastline of Savai'i. Nestled in between, Manono and Apolima are within easy range.

The thirty-first independence celebration inaugurated an honors list with four categories: Malietoa Tanumafili II Service Order for outstanding acts of bravery or heroism (made posthumously to three *tama'aiga* associated with decolonization); the Western Samoa Order of Tiafau for long and outstanding service (six awards); the Western Samoa Order of Merit for outstanding achievement in any field of endeavor (nine awards); and the Western Samoa Certificate of Excellence for exceptionally high achievement in any field of endeavor (nine awards). In addition, three honorary awards were made.

The University of the South Pacific's (USP) silver jubilee was also remembered in Apia. Prime Minister Tofilau Eti opened USP's biannual council at the School of Agriculture on the Alafua campus. He expressed surprise at the small numbers of students of agriculture, and urged better coordination in agricultural research. Pro-Chancellor and Forum Secretariat chief executive Jeremia Tabai replied that Western Samoa had given USP Alafua its first regional Vice-Chancellor (*USP Bulletin*, 4 June 1993).

In June, Parliament was presented with the 1993-94 budget, which projected ws\$168.37 million in expenditures and ws\$169.61 million in revenues. Finance Minister Tuilaepa restated the debilitating effects of successive cyclones and consequent decline in GDP since 1990. The poor performance of the agricultural sector in 1992 was mitigated to some extent by that of Yazaki, automobile wiring assembler and the country's largest export industry. Estimated real GDP

declined by 4.6 percent in 1992, compared to a decline of 7.5 percent in 1990. Import payments increased to an all-time high of ws\$271 million, while export earnings dropped to ws\$14 million, resulting in a balance of payments deficit of ws\$20 million for 1992, the first since 1981. Family remittances declined by 50 percent during the same period. During the first quarter of 1993, net foreign assets dropped by ws\$7.5 million, reducing import cover from eight to six months.

On a brighter note, Tuilaepa promised more privatization and a decline in inflation from its April 1993 rate of 6.2 percent. Government investment in social and economic infrastructure had led to a corresponding increase in investment as a ratio of GDP, from 26 percent in 1989 to 42 percent in 1992. Tuilaepa predicted that, as the agricultural sector recovered, and if the import bill was contained, the economy would grow by 4 percent in 1993.

A. MORGAN TUIMALEALI'IFANO